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Conclusion: What is to be Done? 
One afternoon I accompany Emily on the daily trip she makes to drop her two 
children off at school. She combines her work as a project officer for one of Ghana’s 
leading NGOs with domestic responsibilities for the loose network of extended family 
that live in her house. That is partly why she is late, and in a hurry; and that is partly 
why she is bemoaning the poor state of the roads. Although this frustration is 
particular, she sees it as an indictment of the country more generally. ‘I find it so 
frustrating that nothing in this country ever seems to improve. You think you are 
getting somewhere but then something happens – there is a new government or the 
donors change tack and then all the good work is un-done.’ Later, in a more sanguine 
moment, she reflects on this frustration. ‘I think that the difficulty is that if you live 
here you have to accept things the way that they are. If you don’t do that then you just 
go mad – there is too much that needs doing and if you take that all on yourself...Well 
there’s no way you can do it.’ But if fatalism is sometimes necessary for personal 
sanity, it is also problematic: ‘You see that’s the tension. Personally it might be better 
just to sit back and put your feet up – just accept that that’s the way things are. But if 
you’re committed to trying to change things for the better then you also have to hold 
on to your frustrations. You have to keep dreaming – have to keep believing – or else 
you have nothing. And if you dream you are often going to be frustrated by how 
things are and how they turn out.’  
 Emily articulates what I take to be a more fundamental tension for Ghanaian 
development workers. Regardless of ideological persuasion, they express commitment 
to the prospect of a different and ‘better’ future. They know that this future may not 
come true and are chastened by past experiences. They know that idealism alone will 
not be enough, and so they seek to find practical ways of implementing these. 
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‘Practice’, in this sense, constitutes a constant attempt to close a gap between this 
future prospect and existing circumstances: an attempt to level the difference between 
‘ideology’ and ‘reality’. By the same token ‘ideology’ constitutes a constant opening 
up of this gap – a way of looking at ‘what is’ from the perspective of ‘what might be’; 
a way of perceiving reality in terms of absences, gaps and deficiencies that call for 
intervention. 
For these development practitioners, to hope for development is therefore to 
hold in abeyance the cynicism that sees change as impossible and the fatalism that 
sees change as the inevitable unfolding of processes beyond individual control. The 
hope is not naive, attended as it is, by heightened awareness to the possibility of 
‘failure’. For these development workers, ‘hope’ and ‘despair’ are not mutually 
exclusive alternative possibilities but inside-out versions of one another: it is against 
the hope of a better future, that development workers experience despair at the 
present; it is that despair that in turn stimulates further hope. Movement between these 
states can sometimes be experienced as personally frustrating or even upsetting. 
Nonetheless development workers locate the source of their quest for ‘action’ in this 
movement. They hold – and even cultivate – frustration as a stimulus to change. 
If this obviation between hope and despair constitutes a distinct way of 
perceiving the world, development workers also include themselves within that world. 
Ghanaian development workers are forced to work within particular institutional and 
political structures but do not embrace these structures uncritically. They are aware 
that the institutional apparatus and discourses through which development 
interventions emerge can be as much part of the ‘problem’ as part of the ‘solution’. At 
times they profess fear of getting ‘caught’ in the process: that their own actions and 
thoughts are carried by ideological influences beyond their control and at a tangent to 
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their beliefs. Still, they hold that development presents institutional possibilities and 
resources that can be practically exploited for their own ideological ends. Confronted 
by an institutional reality that they see as problematic, they continue their work, 
claiming that doing something, however compromised, is better than doing nothing.  
Here, too, it is the hope of a better future that prompts despair about a lack of 
‘ideology’ or the ‘selfish’ and ‘corrupt’ ways in which particular development 
professionals sometimes act. Development workers cultivate particular forms of moral 
self against which they measure their own and others’ actions. As much as they 
recognise the need to act on the world, they also recognise the need to re-configure 
the people and institutions that ‘do’ the developing. Accordingly they recognise that 
hope for a better society can at times conceal a more selfish set of personal 
aspirations. They also recognise that interventions undertaken in good faith can at 
times have negative consequences. In moments of self-reflection and self-doubt, they 
even include themselves in these assessments. Still they hope for better forms of 
development, even while, and even because, they know that development has often 
‘failed’. That hope sometimes originates in religious faith, and is also spoken of as a 
kind of faith.  
Since Ferguson’s (1994) seminal study of Lesotho, the metaphor of the 
machine has permeated the quest to understand development practice. If the 
machine’s effect is to remove politics from the ‘product’ of development, focusing on 
the production of development discourses acts to make political dimensions re-appear. 
This machinic imagination has been important in highlighting the role of systems and 
processes in development practice and in bringing to light some of practices that 
underlie surface representation. The metaphor conjures images of an impersonal set of 
systems and processes and of a disenchanted rationality. Even where people do enter 
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this picture, they tend to be presented as cold and calculating – themselves dupes of 
bigger ‘social’ and ‘economic’ processes, or extensions of the logic of the global 
machine in which they participate.   
If development practice can usefully be imagined in terms of machine-like 
systems and processes, then my suggestion is that it is also important to consider the 
people who ‘operate’ these systems – and how and why they do so. A central 
argument of this book is that if we put these people back into our accounts, a different 
and more nuanced picture of development begins to emerge. We start to see the 
complex processes in which development workers have to engage in order to keep 
things working – how the coherence of development is wrested from the contingency 
of practice. At the same time, it becomes apparent that development organisations are 
populated by people with complex motives and ideological outlooks that elude any 
straightforward categorisation.  
I hope this picture adds ethnographic nuance to existing understandings of 
development. By extension, since I suggest the two are indissolubly linked, I hope this 
also refines our understanding of the post-colonial public sphere. But how does an 
empirical description of ‘what is’, relate to development workers’ own concerns with 
‘what could be’? What does this attempt to describe the ‘actual’ reveal about ‘the 
possible’. In other words: 
 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
In the epilogue to The Anti-Politics Machine (1994), Ferguson raises precisely this 
question. In different ways, it is the central question that frames the activities that 
various development professionals engage in and the activities that academics 
undertake in trying to understand and analyse these. Ferguson’s own answer is to 
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suggest that posed at the level of ‘the masses’ there is not one question but many. 
Different people face different problems. Since the people who actually face these 
problems are likely to know most about them, it seems presumptuous to offer 
prescriptions:  
 
The toiling miners and the abandoned old women know the tactics proper to 
their situation far better than any expert does. The only general answer to the 
question, ‘What should they do?’ is that: ‘they are doing it!’ (1994: 281) 
 
I take from this two important points: firstly, that if the question of what to do is to be 
meaningful, it has to be posed in specific terms; and secondly, that before proffering 
‘solutions’ it is important to pay attention to what is already being done.  
Yet in his analysis of the activities of development organisations, this nuanced 
attention to the specificities of practice, gives way to broad-ranging critique:  
 
There is little point in asking what such entrenched and often extractive elites 
should do in order to empower the poor [because] their own structural position 
makes it clear that they would be the last ones to undertake such a project. If 
the governing classes ask the advice of the experts, it is for their own 
purposes, and these normally have little to do with advancing the interests of 
the famous downtrodden masses. (1994:280-1) 
 
This suggestion that the many organisations, activities and practices that go by the 
name of development, are only a part of the problem seems unhelpful.  
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As I hope my account makes clear, development comes into being as the 
intersection of a multiplicity of people, ideas, institutions and technologies. In 
engaging in the practices that bring these together, Ghanaian development 
practitioners are themselves asking and answering the question of ‘what is to be 
done?’ Even where they ask this in the singular (as if there were an answer), the 
situations in which they pose it are different. In practice, there are a multiplicity of 
ways in which the question is asked and answered.  
In relation to development professionals, as much as for ‘the masses’, I 
therefore propose that before asking ‘what is to be done?’ we first need to ask the 
question of what is already being done. In doing, so it is unhelpful to pit the workings 
of ‘development’ against the activities and beliefs of ‘the masses’, as if the only 
important distinctions lay ‘between’ these. More helpful is to look at how different 
ways of enacting development draw together different groups of people with different 
consequences. Still the question remains: what does my account do?  
 
CRITICAL PROBLEMS 
 
Perhaps primarily I hope that taken in the round, it presents descriptive and analytic 
possibilities that have an effect on existing theoretical formulations, that is less a new 
theory than a way of re-perceiving what the role of theory might be. Ferguson’s 
(1994) deconstruction of development discourse has helped pave the way for much of 
the critical analysis that has followed. In this vein, ‘post development’ critics have 
questioned received understandings of the concept of ‘development’. Rather than a 
benign force for good, ‘development’ has increasingly come to be understood as the 
very means by which powerful nations reinforce their economic and political power. 
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In different ways, post-development scholars have attempted to understand the 
mechanisms by which this occurs. Starting from the premise that the ‘power of 
development’ (Crush 1995) derives from its capacity to ‘conceal’, critics have sought 
to ‘un-cover’ the processes by which it ‘really’ works. In particular, post-development 
scholars have directed attention beyond the overtly neutral and objective language of 
development organisations to the political motives taken to animate these. If power is 
driven by disguise, then the role of critical scholarship is a critical un-masking of the 
political relations that underlie ‘surface’ representations. The post-development 
critique can be seen as a ‘stripping back’ of the ‘myth’ of development; an attempt to 
set aside ‘surface representations’ in order to reveal the ‘real’ dynamics at work.  
The arguments and analysis presented in this book do not disprove these ideas. 
It has not been my intention to debunk such theories in the name of a more ‘real’ truth 
about processes and practices through which development works. Yet the tendency 
for scholars to engage with development through such forms of critical deconstruction 
creates problems. Although post-development scholars have roundly criticised the 
objectivist traditions of development, their own concern to locate the ‘real’ 
mechanisms by which such organisations operate works through a similar realist 
ontology. Development critics have assumed that the world is divided into fetish and 
fact, even as they have debated where this line is drawn (cf. Latour 2004). 
Development knowledge has been taken as a social, economic and political 
‘construction’. In this way, critics’ own analytic tools (‘society’, ‘politics’, 
‘economics’ and so forth) are ascribed an un-questioned ‘reality’ against which the 
knowledge and understandings of ‘development’ are de-bunked.  
Rather than debunk development, I have outlined how different people and 
things are gathered together in maintaining it (a stance that parallels Latour’s ‘new 
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critical attitude’ (Latour 2004)). Rather than reduce development to an analytically 
external reality I have tried to add to the reality of development by multiplying 
description of the practices, relations and ideologies through which projects 
practically unfold. Since the object of ‘development’ is produced through a 
multiplicity of ideas, people, technologies and practices, I have attempted to describe 
these practices without recourse to any singular logic, and without subsuming these to 
a singular theory.   
Attending to the multiplicity of realities through which development is 
produced is an act (cf. Mol 2002: 151-2); it is something I have done through multiple 
processes of writing and research. I hope this makes explicit what development 
practitioners leave un-said. I have attempted to add to the understandings that 
development workers produce (documents, texts, discourses) in order to highlight the 
practices required to produce these. This has meant foregrounding the common-places 
of development practice: actions and ideas that go without saying because they come 
without saying (Bordieu 2003). In situating previously discrete practices and 
utterances alongside one another, their meaning is altered. Connections have been 
drawn out on the basis of, connections latent in ‘the field’, though the result is not 
reducible to these. Accordingly I hope this account adds something new to the 
practices it describes, even as a am aware of all it takes away.   
Development paradigms shift with alarming speed. The history of 
development is littered with well-meaning theorists’ failed attempts to provide all-
encompassing answers. New proposals proliferate; attempts to fill the ‘gaps’ that 
‘failure’ creates. But if these failures are not so much theoretical failures as failures of 
theory (the quest for abstract, all encompassing solutions), perhaps there are already 
too many.  
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Rather than a new theory, I therefore offer this account as an attempt to subtly 
re-perceive what already happens; to shift perspective so as to be able to see what 
already takes place but in a new light. I have done so with the intention of amplifying 
understanding of what is productive and useful about these practices, rather than in 
order to denigrate what is not (Mol 2002).  
This does not amount to a wholesale endorsement of ‘development’ – as 
though it were a unified ‘thing’ to be endorsed or denounced. As I have suggested, 
development involves the intersection of many people and things. Not all of them are 
‘good’; but neither are all of them ‘bad’. I hope that part of the utility of the approach 
I have taken is in being able to differentiate the multiplicity of people, ideas and 
practices through which development is constituted, so as to move the discussion of 
‘development’ onto a less abstract footing (Yarrow and Venkatesan forthcoming; (cf. 
Quarles Van Ufford and Giri 2003). I am proposing that we try to recuperate a sense 
of the generative potential of certain understandings and practices that have tended to 
be overlooked in the constant search for a new policy panacea. This means 
recognising that important complexities and ambiguities get overlooked when 
academics try to explain development as a singular, overarching system of 
knowledge.  
If this conclusion is what my account theoretically ‘does’, I hope it might in 
turn prompt reflection on how development could be done differently. My following 
suggestions are not intended as programmatic statements but simply highlight what I 
take to be latent possibilities. I outline these in relation to three key suggestions: 
 
1. ‘Transparency’ is not the only kind of accountability. As this book has sought to 
make explicit, informal relations – friends, ‘contacts’, personal relations –are central 
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to the enactment of ‘civil society’ and to the functioning of development organisations 
more generally. From the perspective of recent advocates of ‘good governance’ these 
relations seem problematic. They are not ‘open’ and ‘transparent’: inclusion or 
exclusion from them is not on the basis of a universal and explicit set of criteria. Yet 
the fact they are not formally accountable does not mean they lack accountability; the 
fact that their usefulness is rarely made explicit does not mean that they are not useful. 
Informal practices and relationships may well be in the public interest, even if they 
are not publicly visible (Cohen 1981: 128). Indeed it is precisely their lack of formal 
visibility that, at times, enables personal relations to work effectively. (For example, 
maintaining autonomy from the state or from donors depends being able to organise 
independently from these). This is not to suggest that ‘informal’ relations constitute 
an alternative to formal institutional procedures. Rather I want to highlight that these 
are mutually implicated forms of practice. Hence the existence of the former need not 
undermine the latter (DuGay 2000: 56).  
Given that the informal nature of such relations constitutes their very 
condition of possibility, there is clearly no sense in which their promotion could ever 
be a meaningful policy objective. However, recognising the importance of these 
relations does make the case against the over-determination of policies that close-
down the space in which such relations operate and emerge. In particular, the 
normative valorisation of ‘transparent’ relations under the guise of ‘good 
governance,’ undermines the effectiveness of relations that do not conform to these 
logics. At best these initiatives provide a way of re-describing relations that already 
exist in terms more acceptable to an external donor audience; at worst the pursuit of 
‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ undermines the very forms of relationship and 
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practice required to bring this about.  Perhaps in this sense, less policy might be better 
policy.  
 
2. Embrace contingency. A variety of otherwise disparate accounts have assumed 
development to be an ordered and coherent system. This book does not dispute the 
existence of order, but takes this to be an active achievement of development practice. 
In other words, coherence is an outcome of ordering (Law 1994) activities that are not 
themselves reducible to the logic of an over-arching system. Although this insight is 
effectively a description of a set of processes that already take place, it does have 
potential consequences for the way in which we understand, value and think about 
these. If coherence is ‘after the fact’ (Mosse 2005b) of the practices and relations that 
produce it, we need to pay more attention to the importance of these practices and 
relations. In particular I have highlighted the attempts of various development 
workers to ‘make things work’ in situations where no easy ‘solutions’ exist. This 
means valuing the contingent and sometimes haphazard practices through which 
people, technologies and artefacts are brought together. Here, again, it is clearly 
absurd to imagine that the promotion of such practices could ever be a meaningful 
policy objective. Rather I underline the point that if policy objectives over-determine 
the space in which development workers operate, valuable practices may be under-
valued if not actively undermined.  
 
3. Less can be more. Scholars of development in general, and anthropological studies 
of development in particular, have been critical of dualisms and oppositions on the 
grounds that these conceal the complexities of social reality for development workers 
and for scholars alike (Crewe and Harrison 1998, Escobar 1995, Gardner and Lewis 
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1996). Rather than view these as opposed to ‘reality’, my account demonstrates how 
oppositions are in fact integral to the ways in which relationships are formed and 
negotiated in the context of development interventions. A focus on the related 
oppositions between ‘local’ and ‘global’, ‘indigenous’ and ‘western’ and ‘policy’ and 
‘practice’, highlights the complex organisational processes through which such 
oppositions are created and sheds light on the ways in which these are used to frame 
social relations and identities. My account demonstrates the relational ways in which 
oppositions are drawn upon, and the highly specific distinctions that they are used to 
make. Against the grain of recent post-development critiques, this perspective 
suggests that the extent to which such oppositions are useful or problematic, 
empowering or disempowering, can only be gauged in relation to specific encounters.  
 
BY WAY OF AN ENDING 
In grappling with the question of ‘what to do’ in the context of medical practice, Mol 
suggests: 
 
The question "what to do" can be closed neither by facts nor arguments...It 
will forever come with tensions -- or doubt. In a political cosmology "what to 
do" is not given in the order of things, but needs to be established. Doing good 
does not follow on finding out about it but is a matter of, indeed, doing. Of 
trying, tinkering, struggling, failing, and trying again. (2002: 177) 
 
This book offers an account of my attempts to grapple with a range of problems 
through a process of trying, tinkering and struggling in the context of my own 
encounters with the multiple forms that development takes; it is what I have tried to 
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do with these problems. I remain acutely aware that it is not adequate to them: 
theoretical problems remain; social and political injustices persist.  
My modest hope is that the result helps others (even in disagreement), trying 
and tinkering with similar issues, whatever ‘ideological’ or ‘practical’ form that 
struggle takes.  
 
 
 
 
